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Abstract: 
Attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPS) continue to grow in frequency. However, cybersecurity academics and 
practitioners have so far focused primarily on computer systems and networks rather than CPS. Given the alarming 
frequency with which cybercriminals attack CPS and the unique cyber-physical relationship in CPS, we propose that 
CPS security needs go beyond what purely computer and network security requires. Thus, we require more focused 
research on cybersecurity based on the cyber-physical relationship between various CPS components. In this paper, 
we stock of the current state of CPS security and identify research opportunities for information systems (IS) 
academics. 
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1 Introduction 
A nation’s critical infrastructure (CI) refers to “fundamental systems and services that are critical to [its] 
security, economic prosperity, and social well-being” (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001). The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (2020)  defines CI in a similar way as “the physical and cyber systems 
and assets that are so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on its physical or economic security or public health or safety”. Based on this definition, 
the U.S. Government has identified sixteen CI sectors: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, 
critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, financial services, 
food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare and public health, information technology, nuclear 
reactors, materials, and waste, transportation, water and wastewater systems (Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, 2020). The communications and information technology (IT) sectors 
collectively comprise critical information infrastructure (CII). The IT sector produces and provides 
hardware, software, and information technology systems and services, while the communications sector 
provides the infrastructure that IT products and services need to communicate and exchange data (e.g., 
the Internet) (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, n.d.). Correspondingly, one might ask 
where cyber-physical systems (CPS) fit into this framework. 
A cyber-physical system (CPS) comprises computers that communicate with sensors and actuators 
embedded in physical systems in a  highly integrated and tightly coupled system (Potteiger et al., 2017). 
Thus, a CPS integrates information technology (IT) systems with the physical componets from other CI 
sectors (e.g., manufacturing, dams, emergency services, healthcare, etc.) and relies on CII for 
communication and coordination. Researchers and practitioners often refer to CPS that focus on 
manufacturing and production as cyber-physical production systems (CPPS) or industrial control systems 
(ICS). When a CPS uses the Internet to exchange data, optimize processes, and monitor devices, one 
refers to it as the Internet of things (IoT). The system’s computational part (the cyber tier) comprises 
information technology, software, hardware, and data, while the physical components (or the physical tier) 
includes devices, machines, and manufacturing plants that various CI sectors use. Specially designed 
sensors integrate these two tiers (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Cyber-physical Systems (CPS) 
CPS have seen increasing use in areas such as healthcare, emergency management, traffic flow control, 
and electric power generation and delivery. CPS examples include the IoT, ICS, smart cities, smart power 
distribution grids, or, for that matter, “smart” anything (e.g., cars, buildings, homes, manufacturing, 
hospitals, appliances, etc.). 
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CPS security represents an important topic because various critical infrastructure (CI) sectors use CPS, 
and their failure can impact physical and economic security and public health. Furthermore, the fact that 
various CI components depend on one another means that a failure in one CI component can cause a 
cascading effect that impacts one or more other CI components. For example, in 1998, a Galaxy 4 
telecommunication sattelite failed, which not only lead to service disruption for more most pagers in use 
(over 90%) but also impacted banking services, ATM transactions, credit card purchases, and 
communication with doctors and emergency medical service providers (Rosenbush, 1998). Therefore, we 
need to protect CPS from cyberattacks. Furthermore, we have seen an increase in the number, 
magnitude, sophistication, and scope of attacks on CPS in the last decade. Examples include: 
 In 2010, a worm named Stuxnet hit the Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz. Exploiting four 
“zero-day vulnerabilities” (i.e., vulnerabilities that the public did not yet know about, which 
meant no patch for them existed). The worms targeted parts of the systems that various 
organizations such as Siemens, Microsoft, and FararoPaya manufactured and/or developed. 
These systems powered the centrifuges used for Uranium enrichment. Stuxnet altered the 
current electrical frequency to the centrifuge drivers, which resulted in damage to the 
centrifuges. By some estimates, the Stuxnet attack delayed the Iranian nuclear program for 
two to five years (Langner, 2011). 
 A cyberattack in 2012/2013 disrupted the Internet network in Iran by attacking the country’s 
infrastructure and communications companies. The attack affected not only Internet 
communication but also nuclear, oil, and information networks (Aryan, Aryan, & Halderman, 
2013). 
 Iranian specialists in electronic warfare brought down an American RQ-170 Sentinel drone by 
cutting off its communications links in order to understand their stealth and intelligence 
capabilities (O’Hanlon, Psiaki, Bhatti, Shepard, & Humphreys, 2013). 
 A cyberattack on Istanbul Ataturk Airport’s passport control system managed to shut the 
system down, which delayed flights and caused passengers to wait in line for hours at the 
airport (Urban, 2017; Livanis, 2016). 
 A source from the Ministry of Energy in Turkey claimed that critical cyberattacks caused 
widespread electricity cuts in Istanbul (Schauer, 2018). 
 In December, 2015, attackers remotely accessed the control centers of three Ukrainian 
electricity-distribution companies. Taking control of the facilities’ supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems, the attackers opened breakers at some 30 distribution 
substations in the capital city Kiev and western Ivano-Frankivsk region and caused more than 
200,000 consumers to lose power (E-ISAC, 2016; Greenberg, 2017).  
 Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack launched via Internet of Things (IoT) devices 
(Sanger & Perlroth, 2016). 
 The WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017 infected thousands of computers worldwide and 
invalidated critical services such as hospitals and manufacturing plants and caused an 
estimated loss of US$4 Billion (Fruhlinger, 2018). 
However, while the increasing frequency with which attackers attack CPS represents an important 
concern, we should also recognize that security that focuses predominantly on cyber-physical systems’  
cyber tier or physical tier (see Figure 1) cannot sufficiently protect these systems. For instance, IS 
academics and practitioners focus on protecting computer systems’ and networks’ confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability (CIA) (Aviˇzienis, Laprie, Randell, & Landwehr, 2004). In doing so, they focus primarily on 
protecting data. However, such a focus cannot sufficiently protect CPS for two primary reasons: 
 Availability: unlike traditional information technology (IT) systems, CPS interact strongly with 
the physical infrastructure and devices, which makers their availability one of the most 
important security objectives. In most computer systems (networked or not), one needs to 
protect the confidentality and integrity of the data that resides on those systems, sometimes at 
the expense of availability (e.g., by strict access-control mechanisms). Business needs (e.g., 
account balance in banks should accurately reflect the true numbers), laws and regulations 
(e.g., protecting patient data to comply with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA)), or both tend to drive an organization to prioritize confidentiality and integrity over 
availability. However, CPS need to remain available at all times. For instance, smart power 
grids need to provide power to a city’s residents without interruption. Thus, CPS become 
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vulnerable to various threats from cyberattackers and cyber-physical attackers (e.g., DoS 
attacks). While well established controls to minimize the risk that cyberattacks pose to 
computer systems exist, the connection with the physical tier creates a unique unique 
challenge to actors responsible for securing CPS because the attack surface extends beyond 
computer and networks to the sensors present on the physical tier (e.g., Colbert, 2017). 
 Safety and reliability: when dealing with traditional critical infrastructure systems, 
organizations expend great effort on addressing their safety and reliability. They develop 
appropriate techniques to detect faults, isolate their causes, and recover components in the 
physical tier. The additional cyber elements in CPS introduce specific vulnerabilities that 
traditional fault tolerance and reliable computing practices do not directly address (e.g., 
Colbert, 2017). Introducing highly integrated CPS into critical infrastructures and emerging 
systems can lead to situations where cyberattacks against the cyber tier in the CPS could 
adversely affect widespread public safety (e.g., Cardenas, Amin, & Sastry, 2008), which 
means one needs to pay special attention to addressing safety and reliability when adding 
cyber elements to CPS.  
In additon to increased emphasis on operational objectives, securing CPS also differs from securing 
traditional IS/IT systems due to several reasons: 
 Interdependent cyber and physical components: while the growing interdependency 
between cyber and physical entities has led to improved system performance, it has also led to 
new avenues for attackers to target a large number of entities by exploiting those 
interdependencies (Potteiger et al., 2017). Since the system’s physical and cyber components 
are tightly coupled, we need to address not only the seurity of the cyber tier and the physical 
tier but also the infrastructure, devices, and processes needed to integreate these two tiers. 
Colbert (2017) has argued that, as CPS owners continue to install remote network control 
devices and incorporate an increasing number of insecure IoR devices in their industrial 
processes, the underlying security of their interdependent operations becomes increasingly 
vulnerable. 
 Defense perspective: most existing research has focused on cybersecurity issues from the 
perspective of a single or centralized defender. However, multiple self-interested stakeholders 
rather than single entities usually manage large-scale CPS. For example, different independent 
system operators (ISO) manage different portions of a single smart power grid. As a result, 
their cybersecurity efforts remain independent. Lack of coorination among these independent 
efforts can result in vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit (Hota, Clements, Bagchi, & 
Sundaram, 2018). Therefore, our approach to CPS security should move from individual 
stakeholders trying to protect their own turf to an approach that requires a coordinated and 
joint effort from every participant in a CPS. 
 Incident response: analyzing a cyberattack provides data, information, and knowledge that 
one can apply to prevent future similar attacks. With CPS, the interconnection between the 
cyber tier and the physical tier makes it harder to analyze cyberattacks. Furthermore, the 
independent ISO that participate in a CPS might not cooperate and share information about 
cyberattacks that occur, which could further hinder them from understanding the attacks. As a 
result, of the ISO may find it difficult to mitigate threats in the future (Potteiger et al., 2017). 
 Incident impact: researchers have conducted much work on cyberattacks on cyber systems 
and physical attacks on physical systems. However, while one may use such research to 
assess traditional attacks on a CPS’s cyber and physical tiers, one may not be able to use it to 
evaluate and assess the impact that an attack has on an entire CPS. Cyberattacks on CPS 
tend to be complex and challenging because they use the cyber physical relationship in CPS 
as part of the attack. The unique relationship between a CPS’s cyber and physical parts makes 
assessing the impact that attacks have on CPS difficult because their complexity make 
traditional assessments fall apart. A prominent cyber-physical attack example includes the 
BlackEnergy attack on the Ukrainian power grid that brought it offline (Pattanayak & Kirkland, 
2018). This attack included a DoS attack on telephone lines, hijacked virtual private networks 
(VPN), disabled control over the power supply, malware, and spear phishing. This highly 
coordinated and sophisticated attack compromised multiple aspects of the power grid, which 
makes it difficult for traditional approaches to estimate its overall impact. 
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To illustrate the cybersecurity objectives and system needs that we discuss above, we use a well-known 
CPS (i.e., embedded medical devices) as an example. We show a generic setup of such a CPS in Figure 
2. Organizations in the CI sector healthcare have increasingly adopted this particular CPS. The system’s 
physical tier comprises the embedded medical device (EMD), and cyber tier comprises mobile devices 
and applications, computers, data storage servers, and relevant software. Sensors on the embedded 
medical devices facilitate integration between the EMD (i.e., physical tier) and the computing devices (i.e., 
cyber tier). Either a private network or the Internet (in which case also qualifies as the IoT) facilitates 
communication between the system’s various components. As Figure 2 shows, the embedded device 
(e.g., gastric stimulators, insulin pumps, deep brain neurostimulators, pacemakers, etc.) comprises the 
relevant sensors, hardware, and software to monitor and treat specific medical problems. The sensors 
transmit readings to relevant computer and mobile devices (e.g., devices that patients, healthcare 
providers, doctors, hospitals, researchers, and so on own). One can collect and store the data that such 
devices generate in the cloud or dedicated data centers. 
 
Figure 2. A Generic Setup of Embedded Medical Devices  
Current cybersecurity resources focus mostly on protecting the system’s cyber tier (i.e., computers, 
databases, cloud storage, and mobile devices) (Fu & Blum, 2013). However, we also need to ensure that 
the health data from sensors should be available to the controlling devices that the relevant actors (e.g., 
doctors and patients) use all the time (i.e., availability has paramount importance). Any disruption could 
adversely impact patients’ health. The fact that we cannot embed redundant devices in patients to ensure 
continuous availability in case a cyberattack compromises the primary device. In addition, one needs to 
ensure the integrity of the health data that moves from the embedded medical device to the control 
devices (e.g., cell phones, computers, etc.) to maintain devices’ reliability and patients’ safety. To fully 
defend this CPS, all the stakeholders need to coordinate and communicate to ensure that they are on the 
same page when it comes to securing it. Patients, doctors, hospitals, device manufacturers, network 
service providers, and cloud vendors should all share the responsibility of protecting patients’ health data 
and ensuring its availability to relevant entities and individuals in a timely manner. While easily said, 
various technical, behavioral, economic, and legal factors make such a task challenging (e.g., Sen, 2018). 
If attackers conduct a cyberattack on this CPS, the corresponding incident response will not be as 
straightforward compared to a cyberattack only on its cyber tier. The interconnection between the 
embedded device sensors, doctors’ and patient’s devices, hospital networks, and the data storage 
vendors,makes analyzing any attack on this system and responding to it in a timely manner more 
challenging. For example, suppose that malware has affected a patient’s mobile phone that hosts the 
application that one needs to analyze the data from an embedded device. The malware then launches a 
DoS attack on the embedded device. Lack of cybersecurity awareness or relevant controls (e.g., anti-
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malware application) on the patient’s device might delay one’s efforts to detect the malware, and, in the 
mean time, critical patrient data will not be availbale to the healthcare provider. An approach in which 
patients and the healthcare providers independently focus on protecting their part of a CPS and the 
embedded device vendor focuses on protecting its product will fail to detect and contain this attack in a 
timely manner. During this interim period, the patient’s health could be endangered. More importantly, the 
integrity of the device itself could be compromised. Finally, unlike cyberattacks on an information system 
that one organization owns, a cyberattack on this CPS can have a wide-ranging impact. For example, it 
could result in adverse impact on patients’ health; legal proceedings against the device manufacturer, 
hospital, and doctors; reduced research efforts on embedded devices; longer delays in approvals for 
embedded devices for heathcare; higher charges to store data that generate embedded devices (due to 
higher risk); and an increase in insurance premiums for actors who use embedded devices. In short, 
security needs for CPS go beyond what pure computer systems require. 
In Section 2, we assess our current knowledge about: 1) designing CPS, 2) security risks to CPS, 3) 
preventing cyberattacks on CPS, 4) detecting such attacks when they happen, and 5) responding to these 
cyberattacks.  
2 Cyber-physical Systems’ Design 
CPS designs and relevant technologies represent a key area in CPS cybersecurity that has attracted 
researchers’ attention. For example, manufacturing and military CPS have traditionally lacked an 
emphasis on cybersecurity. Several existing and ongoing studies in engineering focus on complex 
CPS and address issues such as control, data analytics, autonomy, and information management. 
Potteiger et al. (2017) proposed a model-based software development framework integrated with a 
hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed for rapidly deploying CPS attack experiments. They illustrated the 
framework they developed with a case study on a railway transportation system. The framework 
allows one to emulate cyberattacks and obtain platform-specific performance measurements that one 
cannot easily obtain in a traditional simulation environment. One can use the resulting data to improve 
CPS security during the design process. Additionally, we need to accelerate research on issues such 
as privacy, safety, security, and verification in CPS. 
The Ptolemy Project at the University of California at Berkeley’s Electrical Engineering and Computer 
Sciences (EECS) department identifies and defines the following CPS security objectives that pertain 
to their design: 
 Resilience: A CPS’s resilience refers to its ability to continue operating satisfactorily when 
unexpected inputs, subsystem failures, or environmental conditions or inputs outside the 
specified operating range stress it. Techniques the promote resilience include fault tolerance, 
fault detection, and adaptation. 
 Privacy: with CPS, privacy refers to protecting data on individuals to and from sensors and 
ensuring  other humans or machines cannot access operational data without authorization. 
 Cyberattack prevention: like all networked computing systems, vulnerabilities in the cyber tier 
can affect CPS. Even closed networks (e.g., Iran Nuclear Facilities) have risks due to the 
possibility that one accidentally introduces malicious code (e.g., Stuxnet), back doors, DoS 
attacks, trojans, and other malware.  
 Intrusion detection: with CPS, one needs to consider intrusion into both the cyber and 
physical tiers. Therefore, one needs to invest in all the relevant technical controls (e.g., 
intrusion-detection systems), administrative controls (e.g., separation of duty), and physical 
controls (e.g., motion detection and tracking) to minimize the risk that attackers will intrude on 
their cyber and physical tier components.  
3 Estimating Cybersecurity Risk to Cyber-physical Systems 
In this section, we present the current approaches to estimating CPS security risks. After searching for 
current studies in this area, we found that researchers have conducted significant work to understand and 
estimate CPS security risks. Most studies have focused on a particular CPS application. For example, 
Pretorius and van Niekerk (2015) provided a risk-assessment approach for industrial control systems 
(ICS) in South Africa to identify the gaps that cyberattacks could exploit. In another study, DeSmit, 
Elhabashy, Wells, and Camelio (2016) examined a CPS in the manufacturing domain and proposed a 
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method to assess security risks and vulnerabilities in the system. The method posits that one should first 
map how the system’s cyber, physical, and human elements intersect. After one has completed the 
intersection mapping and identified vulnerable points, one should use decision tree mapping to analyze 
CPS vulnerabilities on low, medium, and high levels.  
Studies that provide more widely applicable methods include one that Huang, Zhou, Tian, Yang, and Qin 
(2018a) conducted. They proposed a risk-assessment framework using a Bayesian network to assess 
cyberattacks on CPS. Radanliev et al. (2018) assessed the risk to CPS using an integrated cyber risk-
assessment approach that accounts for both economic and physical risks and illustrated this approach in 
the IoT context. Elsewhere, Ismail, Leneutre, Bateman, and Chen (2018) proposed a quantitative model 
based on game theory analysis to assess the risks associated with the interdependency between the 
cyber and physical components in a power grid. In scenarios where one can use the Stackelberg game to 
model the interaction between defenders and attackers, they found that defenders can benefit more if they 
include attackers’ reaction in their defense strategy in their analysis, which bounds attacks’ potential 
impact in cases with rational attackers. They also found that, depending on the features of the system that 
one wants to protect, defenders might need to disclose some information about the system’s architecture 
publicly. In doing so, defenders can ensure that they can correctly assess rational attackers’ behavior  that 
the computed payoffs matches the real payoffs of players’ actions and, thus, optimize how they deploy 
valuable defense resources. 
Due to CPS’ integrated nature, cyberattacks on one CPS part often spread to other connected parts. To 
assess the risk that such a spread will occur, Konig and Gouglidid (2018) demonstrated how one can use 
data that vulnerability scanners gather to simulate the infection that arises from a cyberattack and use it to 
assess the likelihood that it will transmit through interconnected networks. Hota et al. (2018) used two 
complementary game-theoretic models to study networked systems’ security. Their model comprised 
multiple self-interested defenders that each manage a set of assets that nodes in a directed graph 
represent. Attacks spread through the network via the interconnecting links in the graph. In the first class 
of game, each defender minimizes its expected loss subject to budget constraints on the defense 
investments, while, in the second class of games, each defender minimizes its cost of defense investment 
subject to the upper bounds that a successful attack will likely affect its asset (or its risk tolerance). Under 
suitable assumptions about how effectively defense investments will reduce attack probabilities, the 
authors found that a (generalized) Nash equilibrium exists in both settings and showed that each defender 
can compute its optimal defense allocation for a given allocation by other defenders by solving a convex 
optimization problem. 
4 Prevent Cyberattacks against CPS  
In this section, we examine the controls, policies, guidelines, standards, and regulations that focus on 
preventing or minimizing the risk of cyberattacks against CPS and whether they work as intended. With 
the way things stand at present, the US needs to work harder towards improving the overall relationships 
between public and private cyber agencies to better protect CPS in its critical infrastructure sectors 
(Weed, 2017). Horowitz (2018) has also discussed the need for the U.S. Government to implement the 
right policies to help adequately protect CPS. Their recommendations include: 1) selecting, certifying, and 
training CPS operators; 2) ensuring coordination among governments and private entities to create 
polices to curate data; and 3) creating market incentives to address potential attacks prior to actual 
incidents (Horowitz, 2018). The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has published 
guidelines for security best practices for general IT in its Special Publication 800-53. Furthermore, to 
address control systems’ security, an integral component in any CPS, the NIST has also published a 
guide to industrial control system security (Stouffer, Falco, & Kent, 2006). On one hand, these guidelines, 
if followed, minimize the cybersecurity risks to CPS. On the other hand, law agencies cannot legally 
enforce them (except for U.S. federal agencies), which means relevant stakeholders often ignore them. 
Securing CPS constitutes an active research area. Rashid, Wan, Quiros, Canedo, and Al Faruque (2017) 
presented a model-based secure-by-design approach for modeling and simulating a CPS’s cybersecurity 
aspects. They illustrated this approach by modeling several classes of cyberattacks that may affect a 
CPS’s normal operations and evaluated the impact that these attacks had on the system via simulation. 
This modeling approach can reduce the engineering effort in developing a CPS, increase its quality, and 
increase its resilience when exposed to cyberattacks. Ensuring a CPS’s resilience requires cross-
discipline analysis and involves many challenges, such as how to address evolving cybersecurity threats. 
To comprehensively understand a CPS’s resilience, refer to the book that Flammini (2019) edited. This 
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work describes emerging paradigms and techniques from two main viewpoints: 1) a CPS’s exposure to 
new threats and 2) a CPS’s potential to counteract them. It offers the latest approaches to evaluating, 
ensuring, and improving resilience in both the development and assessment stages.  
Huang, Chen, and Zhu (2018b) applied Markov games to capture the adversarial interactions between 
attacks on and efforts to defend interdependent critical infrastructures (ICIs). The results state that fewer 
attacks happen when the system has defenders because attackers tend to avoid attacking nodes 
equipped with safeguard procedures. The security strategy for the infrastructure defender suggests that: 
1) defenders’ policy can successfully thwart attacks; 2) as more nodes equip protections, the attack 
number decreases; and 3) attackers avoid attacking nodes with healthy neighboring nodes because they 
have a better chance to survive and receive protection. In another study, Kamhoua et al. (2018) used 
game theory to provide a quantitative approach to perform a cost-benefit analysis on cloud services while 
considering other cloud users’ actions and their different potential losses from a security breach. They 
found that an increase in the probability that a successful attack would compromise a cloud service may 
force other cloud participants to protect their own application/service and, thus, increase overall cloud 
security. They also found an intricate relationship between the total expenses required to invest in security 
and in a higher-profile user’s payoff.  
Schauer (2018) presented a novel risk-management approach for highly connected network 
infrastructures such as the ones that utility providers operate. This approach extends the steps that the 
international risk-management standard ISO 31000 specifies by including activities that specifically 
address utility providers’ particular requirements. The proposed process, called hybrid risk management 
for utility networks (HyRiM), builds on a game theory framework to help utility provides improve their 
mitigation actions and identify an optimal risk-management strategy. It can estimate the worst-case 
damage and determine the corresponding optimal mitigation strategy for a given set of potential risks. 
Other researchers have practically applied the approach with water utility networks (Gouglidis, Konig, 
Green, Rossengger, & Hutchison, 2018), utility networks (Konig, Gouglidis, Green, & Solar, 2018), critical 
infrastructures (Alshawish, Abid, & de Meer, 2018), and a medium-sized electrical cooperative that 
managed a town’s electricity distribution (Zambrano, Caceres, & Martinez, 2018). 
5 Detect Cyberattacks against CPS  
While organizations should take all necessary steps to minimize the risk of cyberattacks, they remain 
vulnerable. Therefore, organizations require controls, policies, and procedures in place to detect 
cyberattacks. In this section, we summarize some recent work in the area.  
Intrusion-detection systems (IDS) have traditionally relied on two broad approaches to detecting 
cyberattacks: signature matching and anomaly detection. In brief, signature-matching techniques involve 
looking for unique signatures in network traffic to identity the related cyberattacks, and anomaly detection 
involves statistical approaches to identify “anomalies” in how computers and network behave that could 
represent cyberattack symptoms. Existing work on detecting intrusions into CPS has primarily built on 
these two techniques. Colbert (2017) examined IDS in industrial control systems (ICS) using a two-control 
process technique that built on traditional IDS based on anomaly detection. This proposed method 
requires one to monitor 1) an ICS’s network component and 2 its critical processes. ICS operators and 
network engineers identify key measures for both the network and the critical processes and define 
threshold values for these measures. As in case of anomaly-detection techniques, IDS generates an 
alarm or alert if these measures breach these thresholds values. In another study, Mo, Chabukswar, and 
Sinopoli (2013) developed a model that used knowledge about systems dynamics to detect attacks on 
CPS. They showed that using a noisy control-authentication signal improves overall attack detection but at 
the expense of control performance. Pal, Adepu, and Goh (2017) applied an a priori algorithm to extract 
process constraints on ICS network traffic to establish the relationship among different process variables. 
They successfully identified process constraints on single variables (if X occurs, then Y will likely occur) 
and applied the technique to a water-treatment plant. Using the algorithm, they identified approximately 
11,500 association rules for the 51 sensors in the plant’s CPS.  
Once stakeholders detect a cyberattack on a CPS, they must have an incident-response procedure in 
place to minimize its adverse impacts. In Section 6, we summarize and analyze current knowledge in this 
area. 
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6 Responding to Cyberattacks against CPS  
Response to any cyberattack on a CPS has three aspects: 1) operational response, 2) policy response, 
and 3) legal response. In this section, we look at the recent developments along these dimensions and 
gauge the current knowledge in each area. 
6.1 Operational Response 
The operational response to cyberattacks on CPS resembles the operational response to traditional 
cyberattacks. One needs to gather as much information as possible while minimizing the attack’s adverse 
impacts. For example, Rohr (2018) offered a list of actions to follow and mistakes to avoid so that the 
victim organization can collect data on the attack (for later analysis) and stop it before it does “too” much 
damage. In fact, after a simple online search for the keywords “responding to cyberattacks”, we found 
several papers from cybersecurity consultants, practicing IT administrators, database experts, and legal 
experts on this topic. They recommend actions such as having a response team (e.g., a computer 
emergency response team) to handle the incident response to cyberattacks, conducting regular “drills” on 
responding to cyberattacks, training employees so that everyone knows their role in detecting and 
responding to the attacks, understanding the legal implications of their response, and coordinating and 
communicating with other stakeholders in the CPS (e.g., employees, customers, trade partners, etc.), 
relevant law enforcement, and regulatory agencies. A lack of effective coordination and communication 
between various stakeholders in the CPS represents the main challenge to an effective operational 
response to cyberattack on CPS. Indeed, Weed (2017) emphasized that U.S. public and private sectors 
need to cooperate in securing systems critical to U.S. infrastructure.  
6.2 Policy Response 
After any cyberattack on a CPS, the relevant stakeholders should analyze the missing controls that 
contributed to the attack. This analysis should lead to policy changes with the intent to prevent similar 
incidents in the future. For instance, Pattanayak and Kirkland (2018) reviewed cybersecurity challenges 
with respect to ICS in the Unites States and, in particular, focused on the federal stance from 2009 to 
2018 on growing and supporting cybersecurity. They investigated attacks on critical infrastructure in 
Ukraine that used the BlackEnergy and CrashOverride malware tools in order to learn lessons that would 
help mitigate future attacks that relied on these tools. Others working in the area have found that a lack of 
key policy initiatives that deal with the communication and coordination among the various stakeholders in 
the CPS often contribute to the cyberattacks (e.g., Weed, 2017). Weed’s (2017) recommendations for 
detecting and responding to cyberattacks on CPS include linking the different federal agencies involved in 
defending critical national infrastructure, creating international cybersecurity information-sharing channels, 
and having public and private sector agencies participate in national cybersecurity exercises. 
Furthermore, he suggested creating and improving automated tools for detecting cyberattacks. Towards 
this end, Laddaga et al. (2019) created a tool called Deriving Cyber-security Requirements Yielding 
Protected Physical System (DCRYPPS) to automate the cybersecurity requirements that a CPS requires.  
6.3 Legal Response  
Cyberattack victims can rely on several laws and regulations when they clearly identify threat agents and 
when such agents reside in the same jurisdiction as the victim CPS. However, when one cannot clearly 
identify threat agents or they reside in locations beyond the jurisdiction of the country in which the 
compromised CPS resides, few, if any, regulations can help victim CPS respond with legal action against 
the threat agent(s).  
In particular, the US lacks a single, comprehensive federal law that regulates cybersecurity. Instead, the 
U.S. Government has approached cybersecurity by regulating only certain sectors and types of sensitive 
information (e.g., health and financial). Furthermore, a patchwork of state laws adds to the complex 
cybersecurity legal landscape. Finally, most federal and state laws primarily focus on securing personally 
identifiable information (PII). Therefore, these laws do not necessarily apply to all data-breach incidents. 
For example, the laws would not cover a data breach that targeted a power utility grid (and, thus, 
interrupted the power supply) but that did not compromise PII data. Interestingly, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), which protects certain wire, oral, and electronic communications 
from unauthorized interception, access, use, and disclosure, could apply to protect digital signals travelling 
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between a CPS’s sensors and computer systems. However, we know about no incident in which someone 
used this law to charge the threat agent that attacked a CPS.  
Many advanced economies such as Canada, Israel, and Japan have pivoted toward creating privacy 
regimes that are compatible with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union. 
Once again, we know about no laws in these countries that specifically address cyberattacks against 
CPS. According to Nicholas (2018), a key challenge in criminalizing cyber threats to CPS from threat 
agents who do not operate from inside the victim’s country’s jurisdiction concerns “the fact that the world 
lacks a common space for finding out the facts about cyberattacks, for learning from such incidents, for 
interpreting laws, and for agreeing on who did what to whom” (Nicholas, 2018).   
On the positive side, we must point out that debates continue in and between nations on the best way to 
address such cyberattacks on CPS. Recently, the US (Waxman, 2017), the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (Gaud, 2017), and the EU (Muncaster, 2017) have deliberated over whether they should 
categorize some cyberattacks as constituting acts of war, armed attacks, or uses of force (under 
international law). In fact, the Pentagon has a general framework to identify and respond to a cyberattack 
that meets the threshold of an armed attack under international law. The U.S. Department of State even 
outlined principles that govern cyber warfare in 2012 (Koh, 2012). A key challenge that the US and other 
nations face in trying to come up with an actionable law on CPS security concerns the confusion among 
policymakers in defining the legal thresholds to classify cyberattacks on CPS as “acts of war”. Nations 
require a clear and widely accepted threshold before they can invoke existing international regulations. 
For example, a nation can invoke Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter if they can classify a cyberattack 
against a CPS as “use of force” and/or an “armed attack” respectively. In the September, 2016, U.S. 
Senate Armed Services Committee’s cybersecurity hearing, the Pentagon proposed that a cyberattack 
that meets the threshold of an “act of war” would include a “significant loss of life, injury, destruction of 
critical infrastructure, or serious economic impact (Adams & Reiss, 2017). However, other countries do not 
necessarily share this stance. Furthermore, while the U.S. Government has proactively made public 
statements about international law’s applicability to cyberspace operations and sought to hold other states 
and non-state actors accountable for their cyber operations, it has done little publicly to advance the 
dialogue about what specific types of cyberattacks violate international law (Adams & Reiss, 2017).  
As for future, since the fifth United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Information Security’s (UN-
GGE) failure (Korzak, 2017) to produce a consensus report after two decades and five sessions with 
governmental groups of experts (Tanglen & Yammine, 2018), the following three major initiatives to 
mitigate the risks to cybersecurity have emerged: 
1) The United Nations (UN) approved two groups to develop international rules and norms to 
improve cybersecurity across borders: 1) the U.S.-led Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) 
that comprises 25 experts that represent 25 states (including the five permanent members of 
the United Nation’s Security Council) and 2) the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) that 
Russia and China lead and that all U.N. member states may join. The main challenge that 
U.N.-sponsored initiatives face concerns arriving at a consensus. The fact that similar past 
initiatives have failed creates no hope that these current groups will succeed.  
2) Major tech corporations in cooperation with some nation states, think tanks, and civil society 
organizations have voluntarily formed groups such as the Paris Call, the Cybersecurity Tech 
Accord, the Charter of Trust (Bruer & Webel, 2018), and the Global Commission on the 
Stability of Cyberspace (GCSC). The initiatives focus on improving cybersecurity through 
international cooperation between all relevant stakeholders. However, they recommend non-
binding guidelines for cybersecurity. Furthermore, in the absence of major international powers 
such as the US, the UK, Russia, and China, these groups may find it challenging to convince 
countries to adopt them. At best, these guidelines will have only limited and indirect impact on 
cybersecurity (Efroni, 2019).  
3) Some nation states have decided to identify and name the threat agents behind cross-border 
cyberattacks on computer networks and CPS and to lawfully retaliate against these threat 
agents via diplomatic or economic sanctions (Efroni, 2019). For example, in May, 2019, the US 
indicted a Chinese national and unnamed conspirator for hacking and stealing data from nearly 
80 million customers of the healthcare company Anthem in 2015 (Volz, 2019), which 
researchers previously linked to Chinese state-sponsored actors (Threatconnect Research 
Team, 2015). However, the question remains as to whether this strategy works as a deterrent. 
Carlin (2016), who oversaw the early efforts to charge foreign hackers as assistant attorney 
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general for national security from 2014 to 2016, has written about charging foreign hackers 
more broadly as part of a package of tools that the U.S. Government can use to disrupt and 
deter state-sponsored hacking. Hinck and Maurer (2019) have supported his efforts in stating 
that that this approach: 1) could lead to the arrest of those accused and may deter individual 
hackers from working with particular states and 2) could communicate important details about 
hacking operations to the public and result in lessons learned. In contrast, Goldsmith and 
Williams (2018) have argued that charging Chinese hackers for stealing U.S. trade secrets has 
failed to deter such activity. Furthermore, this approach could affect broader alliance 
relationships among countries (Smeets, 2019). To bring about these charges, countries need 
to proactively monitor threat traffic globally (Nakasone, 2019). In doing so, they will need to 
access traffic outside their own and their adversaries’ networks, such as routers in Nairobi, 
servers in Denmark, or operating infrastructure in any other country around the world. As a 
result, these activities could lead to friction with friendly nations (Nakasone, 2019).  
In short, the national and international legal communities need to start a serious discussion on the laws 
and regulations that target cyberattacks on CPS to resolve interpretation issues.  
7 Conclusion and Opportunities 
CPS have an integral role in our lives. These systems have seen increasing use in areas such as 
agriculture, aeronautics, building design, civil infrastructure, energy management, environmental quality 
control, healthcare and personalized medicine, manufacturing, emergency response, and transportation. 
The impact that cyberattacks have on CPS can go beyond data and identity theft or stolen credit cards. 
These attacks can disrupt normal societal functions such as power supply and distribution, transportation, 
and communications. Therefore, we need to minimize the risk that these cyberattacks pose. In this paper, 
we summarize state-of-the-art cybersecurity research that pertains to CPS as a way to better understand 
the subject. We summarize the security objectives and relevant controls for a CPS’s cyber tier and the 
physical tier in Figure 3. The common area between the two tiers represents the integration between the 
two tiers and their dependence on each other via the data they share. 
 
Figure 3. Cybersecurity Objectives & Relevant Controls  
A large body of research that focuses on CPSs’ cyber and physical tiers already exists. In addition, much 
research has provided methods for conducting CPS security risk assessments. Cybersecurity practitioners 
who have proposed standards, guidelines, and procedures to minimize cybersecurity risks to CPS have 
primarily conducted studies on preventing cyberattacks on CPS. However, information systems (IS) 
academics have a huge research opportunity in this area. For instance, they can 1) investigate the 
effectiveness of these standards, guidelines, and procedures in the CPS security context; 2) identify what 
factors influence stakeholders to adopt these standards, guidelines, and procedures; and 3) quantify the 
benefits that stakeholders gain from adopting these standards, guidelines, and procedures. Similarly, IS 
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researchers also have an opportunity to conduct work on detecting cyberattacks on CPS and, in 
particular, on detecting cyberattacks on the data that travels between the physical and the cyber tiers. The 
link between the two tiers can provide opportunities to threat agents to launch cyberattacks attacks such 
as DoS attacks (e.g., Su & Ye, 2018) and man-in-the-middle attacks (e.g., Lesi, Jovanow, & Pajic, 2018). 
Some interesting studies have proposed controls and procedures for detecting attacks on both a CPS’s 
cyber and the physical tiers. However, these studies have focused on specific CPS, which limits their 
application to those particular CPS. Given that various sectors have increasingly used CPS, researchers 
have a good opportunity to design and develop intrusion-detection controls and procedures for these 
different CPS. Finally, when it comes to responding to cyberattacks on CPS, we have much relevant 
research in the area of operational and policy responses to such attacks. However, we lack research on 
legal responses to cyberattacks on CPS, especially in situations where nation states perform an attack 
and/or the threat agents reside in areas beyond the jurisdiction of the country in which the compromised 
CPS exists. 
As far as research methodology goes, current research on CPS security has predominantly relied on 
simulations, testbeds, and modeling. For instance, Wadhawan, Neuman, and Al Majali (2018) used the 
outputs from multiple cyberattacks on various systems in a smart grid as inputs into the Network and 
PowerWorld Simulator to analyze how cyberattacks potentially destabilize underlying power systems. 
Adepu, Kandasamy, and Mathur (2018) presented the Electrical Power and Intelligent Control (EPIC) 
testbed, a small-scale industrial grade smart grid testbed that mimics real-world full-size power systems. 
They analyzed a power supply-interruption attack and a physical-damage attack using the EPIC testbed to 
discuss methods that one can use to mitigate these attacks on real-world systems. Zhou, Gou, Huang, 
and Yang (2018) reviewed the current state of methods and testbeds that researchers have used to 
examine CPSs’ fragility, robustness, and security and found that they have extensively relied on these 
methodologies. More recently, several studies have used game theory in their research. Readers can 
refer to Alpcan and Basar (2010), Laszka, Felegyhazi, and Buttyan (2014), and Tambe (2011) for 
comprehensive discussions on the literature on applying game theory to model decentralized decision 
making among multiple stakeholders (as in CPS). We can classify most existing work that has used game 
theory into two distinct paradigms. In the first paradigm, referred to as interdependent security games 
(Laszka et al., 2014, Kunreuther & Heal, 2003), researchers have treated each node in the network as an 
independent decision maker responsible for protecting itself. Jiang, Anantharam, and Walrand (2011), 
who investigated inefficiency equilibria in interdependent security, Schwartz, Shetty, and Warland (2013), 
who studied the effectiveness of cyber insurance, and Hota and Sundaram (2016), who researched the 
impacts of behavioral decision making in interdependent scenarios, have used this approach. In the 
second paradigm, researchers have typically considered two players, an attacker and a defender, who 
compete over attacking and defending multiple targets. Game-theoretic models in this second framework 
that cybersecurity researchers have used include Stackelberg security games (e.g., Tambe, 2011), 
Colonel Blotto games (e.g., Roberson, 2006), and network interdiction games (e.g., Israeli & Wood, 2002). 
Researchers have applied these models when conducting work on protecting physical assets (e.g., 
Tambe, 2011), analyzing military conflicts (e.g., Roberson, 2006), and securing CPS (e.g., Durkota, Lisy, 
Bosansky, & Kiekintveld, 2015; Gupta, Schwartz, Langbort, Sastry, & Basar, 2014). Finally, some studies 
have investigated multi-defender security games with the assumption that defenders have a discrete 
strategy space (e.g., Letchford & Vorobeychik, 2013; Lou, Smith, & Vorobeychik, 2017), while others have 
relaxed this assumption (e.g., Hota et al., 2018). 
We also need to consider that CPSs’ continuing evolution leads to new challenges that we need to 
address to secure CPS. These challenges require continuing research in the risk, prevention, and 
detection areas. We identify several areas that provide exciting research opportunities to IS academics: 
 Designing CPS: designing CPS involves various separate components in the cyber and 
physical tiers that are integrated together. Designers have primarily treated these components 
as independent entities and focused on individual systems’ security with little concern for the 
cyber-physical relations between them. Future research on designing CPS needs to address 
integrated systems’ security needs from the design process’s beginnings. These studies 
should identify and test cybersecurity controls for not only the components in the cyber tier and 
the physical tier but also the secure interaction and integration between the two tiers. 
Designing a CPS to ensure its overall security from the ground up has potential to reduce risk, 
increase prevention, and help stakeholders detect attacks on the system.  
 Privacy: a key cybersecurity objective with CPS (see Figure 3) involves ensuring the 
confidentiality and integrity of the data that flows between the system’s cyber and physical 
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tiers. To do so, one could implement access control techniques between sensors in the 
physical tier and the computing devices in the cyber tier, which would reduce the risk that 
someone could access the data that travels between the two tiers without authorization (e.g., 
Rasmussen, Castelluccia, Benjamin, & Capkun, 2009). Another solution could involve using 
cryptographic systems to identify, authenticate, and authorize the components that reside in 
the physical and cyber tiers. However, one would face many challenges in implementing such 
solutions, such as power supply constraints, limited computation resources, the need to reduce 
how often devices require upgrades or replacements, and the prohibitively high cost. While 
some researchers have suggested ways to design sensors that avoid concerns about the 
power that cybersecurity controls require (e.g., Halprin et al., 2008; Beck, Masny, Geiselmann, 
& Bretthauer, 2011, Hosseini-Khayat, 2011), we require more work in this area.  
 Incentive design: any CPS has several independent stakeholders in both the cyber and the 
physical tiers (e.g., software vendors, sensor manufactures, network service provided, facilities 
owner, etc.). In order to secure CPS, these stakeholders need to communicate, coordinate, 
and cooperate with one another. Furthermore, unlike cyberattacks on a single organization or 
platform, attacks on CPS require a coordinated response from all involved stakeholders. To 
ensure stakeholders respond in this way (without any legal regulations), incentives would need 
to exist to make cooperation and coordination the optimal strategy. The solution should 
optimally balance reward and risk sharing to encourage cooperation among the CPS holders. 
Accordingly, researchers have ample opportunities to conduct work in areas such as incentive 
design, game theory, negotiations, incident response, business continuity planning, and 
cybersecurity risk assessment of integrated but independent entities.  
 Coordination and communication between CPS stakeholders: practitioners and academics 
have identified the lack of or poor communication and coordination between various CPS 
stakeholders (i.e., network infrastructure providers, sensor manufacturers, hardware and 
software vendors, etc.) as a key factor that has an adverse impact on their ability to prevent 
cyberattacks on CPS and responding to them when they happen. IS academics can 
investigate current approaches to coordination and communication between CPS stakeholders 
and propose better ones where applicable. Accordingly, researchers who conduct work related 
to emergency response systems have many opportunities in this area since they deal with 
similar challenges already. 
 Joint CPS risk assessments: at present, various stakeholders assess the risk that attacks will 
have on only their part of a CPS. In the example that we present in Figure 2, healthcare 
providers (e.g., hospitals) will assess their computers and networks, the organizations that 
manufacture embedded medical devices will do the same for their devices, and the 
organizations that manufacture computing devices (e.g., computers, mobile devices) and 
software producers will try to harden their products. IS academics can investigate the factors 
that lead to this independent and uncoordinated approach to securing a CPS, provide a more 
comprehensive and coordinated approach to assessing the cybersecurity risk to all its parts, 
and identify tangible benefits that one approach has over others.  
Researchers have come a long way in understanding CPS security objectives. However, they still need to 
conduct much more work to meet these objectives, especially as CPS continue to advance and evolve. 
Accordingly, IS academics have an opportunity to contribute towards more secure CPS design, effective 
cybersecurity controls, effective strategies for cooperation among CPS stakeholders, and better public 
policies to incentivize this cooperation. We outline many challenges in this paper, which makes this area 
an exciting one for IS researchers to make their unique contributions. 
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